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ABSTRACT 
 
PRESTON, JM (1992).  A simple model of rail infrastructure capacity and costs.  ITS Working 
Paper 370.  Institute for Transport Studies, University of Leeds. 
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A SIMPLE MODEL OF RAIL INFRASTRUCTURE CAPACITY AND 
COSTS 
 
1.INTRODUCTION 
 
The recent White Paper on "New Opportunities for the Railways" (Cm 2012, 1992) proposes that 
British Rail's responsibilities for operation and infrastructure will be separated.  A new track 
authority, Railtrack, will be established and will operate without subsidy, except for capital grants in 
cases where a satisfactory cost-benefit return is achieved.  It is acknowledged that these new 
arrangements will lead to some difficulties in allocating and charging for infrastructure, especially 
where rail infrastructure is congested, and consultants have been hired by Government to examine 
this issue.  The principles that Government has specified should underly the access and charging 
regime are that it should: 
(a)Promote efficient operation 
(b)Promote competition and innovation 
(c)Encourage efficient use of infrastructure and other resources 
(d)Not discriminate unfairly between competing operators and services 
(e)Provide the means for financing Railtrack's infrastructure. 
 
The relevant theory is embodied in the literature concerning peak load pricing and optimal 
investment for public enterprises as expounded in standard text books (Turvey, 1971, Rees, 1984, 
Brown and Sibley, 1986.) and put into practice in most areas of the transport sector (eg Hansson and 
Nilsson, 1989, for rail, Small and Winston, 1988, for road, Bishop and Thompson, 1992, for air).  
The aim of this paper is not to make a contribution to this theory but to use it in conjunction with 
simple models of rail's infrastructure requirements and costs to highlight the key problems in 
infrastructure allocation and charging. 
 
The structure of this paper is as follows.  In section two we consider a hypothetical rail line and the 
likely costs of different service levels.  In section three, we relax the assumption that all trains are 
operated at the same speed and re-examine the likely costs of different service levels.  In section 4, 
we go on to examine the pricing implications of our findings.  In a final section, the implications of 
this analysis for policy are assessed. 
 
 
2.RAIL INFRASTRUCTURE REQUIREMENTS AND COSTS - 
SERVICES SAME SPEED 
 
2.1INFRASTRUCTURE REQUIREMENTS 
 
Suppose two towns, A and B, are 25 km apart and are linked by a single track railway.  The average 
speed of trains on this track is 60 km/hr and it takes 5 minutes for the trains to turn round at each 
end of the line.  The capacity of this line can be estimated by a simple formula: 
 
K = 60/[2 (D/S + T)] (1) 
where K = Capacity (in trains per hour) 
D = Distance (in km) 
S = Speed (in km/min) 
T = length of layover/Turn-round time (in minutes) 
 
 
This is sometimes referred to as the one engine-in-steam problem 
 
In the above example, it should be evident that K=1.  The maximum capacity of the line is one train 
per hour.  If additional capacity is to be provided then passing loops need to be installed.  The 
capacity of the line is still estimated by formula (1) but D now becomes the distance between 
passing loops and T = the time spent in  a loop.  Suppose the minimum length for a loop is 200 
metres and T remains 5 minutes, then: 
 
with 1 loop the capacity is 1.72 trains per hour 
with 3 loops the capacity is 2.70 trains per hour 
with 7 loops the capacity is 3.77 trains per hour 
with 15 loops the capacity is 4.71 trains per hour etc 
 
It is assumed in this example that loops are added incrementally, once one loop is installed at the 
half-way point, the only additional way to increase capacity is to instal loops at the quartile points 
(so that there are three overall).  This is likely to be more cost effective than removing the existing 
loop and installing two new loops. 
 
A further point that needs to be taken into account is that each additional loop increases end to end 
journey time by 4.8 minutes.  In practise this would rule out the installation of loops unless the value 
of T could be reduced.  These assumptions lead to the installation of loops exhibiting a diseconomy 
of scale. 
 
The alternative is to install double track.  The appropriate formula for capacity becomes: 
 
K = 60/ (H/S) (2) 
 
Where H is the headway or block distance between trains.  For example, if the headway was 2 km, 
then the capacity of the line could be as high as 30 trains an hour.  However, this theoretical 
capacity is likely to be curtailed in practice for a number of reasons.  In particular, in this example 
the trains need to be turned round at the terminals.  This might be dealt with by adding the variable 
T to the denominator of (2) resulting in an estimated capacity of 8.57 trains per hour.  Without 
switches, trebling the track would only increase capacity to 9.57 trains, whilst without switches 
quadrupling track would increase capacity to 17.14 trains per hour. 
 
In the above we are dealing with a non integer number of trains per hour.  If we assume the capacity 
is determined by passenger flows during the peak two hours capacity can be re-expressed as the 
number of peak train runs (see Table One).  However for double and quadruple track railways this 
leads to non-integer headways, the number of train runs are therefore further adjusted.  However, 
even the revised service intervals fails to result in a clock-face pattern.  The clock-face service 
patterns possible are also shown in Table One. 
 
2.2SERVICE COSTS 
 
Assume that the service has uniformly distributed demand throughout a sixteen hour day and a 350 
day year.  The single track when utilised at full capacity has average costs of £15 per train km [Box 
(1991) reports British Rail as exhibiting unit costs of between £10 to £15 per train mile at 1991 
prices].  Suppose further that one-third of costs are assumed to be fixed, relating principally to the 
provision of terminals and track [Box estimates these items accounted for around 34% of British 
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Rail's costs in 1991, although they should not necessarily be considered fixed].  It is assumed that 
passing loops can be provided at an additional cost of £80k pa per loop.  Doubling track is assumed 
to result in a doubling of fixed costs as economies in, for example, land purchase are assumed to be 
cancelled out by increased costs due to signalling. 
 
The resultant cost profiles based on these assumptions are given by Table Two and Three and 
illustrated by Figures One and Two.  We assume that rail infrastructure exhibits indivisibilities and 
over the range of output considered only five levels of infrastructure provision are feasible.  If 
infrastructure is at full capacity, we observe a pattern of declining average costs up to a minimum 
efficient scale (96 trains a day), after which costs are constant.  It is this feature of rail technology 
that is the main source of economies of scale.  However, in practice rail infrastructure is not always 
operated at full capacity and the Average Total Cost (ATC) curve exhibits the familiar "saw's tooth" 
pattern and is the main source of economies of density. 
 
The Short Run Marginal Cost (SRMC) curves in Figures One and Two also exhibits a familiar 
pattern.  For the most part, they are horizontal and co-incide with the average variable cost curve.  In 
this example, we have assumed that operating costs exhibit constant returns although in reality we 
might expect some increasing returns due to better utilisation of staff and vehicles, use of longer 
vehicles and operation of more direct services (Keaton, 1991).  Where additional infrastructure is 
required, the short run marginal cost curve becomes vertical.  Given indivisibilities of this type, the 
concept of a Long Run Marginal Cost (LRMC) is not really meaningful, but an approximation may 
be provided by an Average Incremental Cost (AIC) measure which, given n levels of infrastructure 
provisions might be written as: 
 
AICn, n-1 = [ TCn - TCn-1 ]  [ Qn - Qn-1 ] (3) 
whereTC = Total Cost 
Q  = Output (Trains per day) 
 
The AIC curve in Figures One and Two is drawn at the mid-point of Q for each level, n.  The AIC 
curve is always below the ATC curve, initially is downward sloping, but rapidly adjusts to exhibit 
an upward slope. 
 
 
3.RAIL INFRASTRUCTURE REQUIREMENTS AND COSTS - 
DIFFERING SPEEDS 
 
3.1INFRASTRUCTURE REQUIREMENTS 
 
We now assume that two types of service are operated on the branch line, a fast service with a speed 
(SF) of 2 km per minute and a slow service (SS) with a speed of 1 km per minute (as before).  The 
capacity for single track can be estimated by modifying equation (1) to give: 
 
K = 120  [2 [ D/SF + T] + 2 [ D/SS + T ]] (4) 
 
The capacity for double track can then be calculated as: 
 
K = 120  [ H/SF + (D/SS - (D - H)/SF + T ] (5) 
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where D = Distance over which fast and slow trains follow each other 
 
The implied capacities, expressed in terms of trains per day rounded down to the nearest even 
integer, are given by Table Four.  Assuming non-clock face headways it can be seen that, compared 
to Table Two the capacity of the branch line has increased by up to a third as a result of the speeding 
up of every other service.  By contrast, the capacity of the double track has been reduced by almost 
one-fifth, as has the capacity of the quadruple track.  This is caused by the fast trains catching up to 
slow trains.  Capacity can be increased by bunching fast or slow trains together, a scheduling 
process known as `flighting' (for an illustration see White, 1986, page 175).  However, this violates 
our assumption of alternate fast and slow trains.  Alternatively, the capacity of double track can be 
increased by the installation of switches or passing loops, thus reducing the distance, D, that fast 
trains follow slow trains.  Some hypothetical examples are given by Table Four.  The installation of 
one short section of treble track with switches increases capacity by over 40%, with three sections 
of treble track capacity increases by over 90%.  However, although capacity utilisation is increased, 
so is end to end journey time, whilst the pattern of alternate fast and slow trains may break down. 
 
3.2SERVICE COSTS 
 
As before, we assume a sixteen hour day and a 350 day year.  The variable cost of slow services 
remains at £10 per km but for fast services is assumed 20% higher at £12 per km.  As the result of 
providing for fast services the infrastructure `fixed' costs are also higher, by 10% for single track (so 
that costs are £1540k per annum).  Similarly, the costs for a passing loop are higher at £100k pa for 
each loop (up 25%).  This illustrates the well known finding that some so-called fixed costs vary 
with service quality requirements (Joy, 1989). 
 
The resultant cost profiles are given by Figure Three.  The ATC curve again is downward sloping 
over most of the output range but does begin to slope upwards with the installation of quadruple 
track.  However, this is largely due to the fact that, under our assumptions, quadruple track without 
switching is technically inefficient compared to alternative track configurations.  The ATC curve 
again exhibits a `saw's tooth' pattern, although this is less marked than before, except for the more 
double/quadruple track.  The predominantly horizontal SRMC, with vertical off-shoots when 
capacity is reached is as before, but our approximation of LRMC, the AIC curve exhibits a different 
shape to that exhibited in Figures One and Two.  The W-shape of the AIC curve results from the 
(unrealistic) assumptions concerning the capacity constraints imposed on the double and quadruple 
track.  Nonetheless, the AIC curves does intersect the smoothed ATC curve at its (approximate) 
minimum point. 
 
 
4.PRICING IMPLICATIONS 
 
4.1SERVICES SAME SPEED 
 
Suppose the demand for a rail service linking A and B at 25 minutes journey time is given by the 
straight line curve Do Do in Figure Four.  There are at least three pricing/output possibilities. 
(i)Traditionally public utilities in Britain are required to price at LRMC.  Assuming that the AIC 
curve is a reasonable approximation of the LRMC curve, this would be at point A, which 
theory tells us should be the welfare optimal point.  However, because of the increasing 
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returns to scale inherent in rail technology, pricing at A will fail to cover total costs by an 
amount equivalent to AB per train run.  However the White Paper requires the Railtrack 
authority to operate without subsidy, thus precluding the financing of this deficit. 
 
(ii)Alternatively, price may be set equal to SRMC, in this case at D.  Quadruple track is not 
supplied, instead price is used to ration capacity to double track levels.  In this case, the 
Railtrack authority earns a profit of DE per train run.  Such super normal profits will be 
prohibited by the White Paper's proposed Rail Regulator. 
 
(iii)Thus, the most likely outcome would be to price at ATC, in this case at point C.  This will lead 
to welfare losses compared to the price/output combination at A, although these can be 
reduced if demand elastic and inelastic market segments can be identified and Ramsey 
pricing used to have higher mark-ups on LRMC in the latter than the former.  However, the 
scope for Ramsey pricing is likely to be limited by the White Paper's requirement that 
infrastructure charges should not discriminate unfairly between competing operators and 
services.  The more likely alternative would be the development of a two-part tariff, with an 
access charge to cover fixed costs (administered on a per vehicle basis) and as cost per 
vehicle kilometre to cover variable costs. 
 
4.2SERVICES WITH DIFFERENT SPEEDS 
 
The same three price/output combinations are relevant where services are not homogenous but, as 
Figure Five shows, the infrastructure implications are more diverse.  This stems from the fact that 
demand for train services is related to the quality of the service provided.  The demand curve DoDo 
in Figure Five is drawn parallel and outwards of the corresponding demand curve in Figure Four to 
reflect the higher average speeds in the former case.  Similarly, in both diagrams demand curves D1 
D1 and D3 D3 are drawn inwards but parallel to D0 D0 to reflect the effect of one and three passing 
loops respectively on increasing end to end journey time.  However, in these diagrams no attempt is 
made to reflect the effect of increased output on demand, in terms of reducing wait times.  The 
result of these assumptions is that the relevant demand curve is discontinuous, and may be 
represented by the bold line D1D1D3D3D0D0 in Figure Five.  The resultant price/output 
combinations are as follows: 
 
(i)Pricing at LRMC results in point A and losses per train run of BA.  Only single track with three 
passing loops is provided. 
(ii)Pricing at SRMC results in point D and profits of ED.  Only single track with one passing loop is 
provided. 
(iii)Pricing at ATC results in Point C.  Double track with no passing loops is provided. 
 
 
5.POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
5.1ACCESS ISSUES 
 
Our simple models highlight some of the problems that are likely to arise from a policy of open 
access.  Suppose we take our first model (Table Two, Figure One) as an example and assume that 
capacity is restricted to 120 trains per day (ie double track).  The existing operator operates 120 
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trains a day.  A new operator wishes to operate an half-hourly service (32 trains per day).  Four 
measures might be considered: 
 
(i)Administrative measures, usually based on historical precedent (`grandfather rights').  In this case, 
the entrant would be refused access, but such a policy would be contrary to the White Paper 
and EC directive 91/440.  If the principle of integer minute headways is abandoned partial 
access can be accommodated with the entrant being granted 16 train runs.  If the incumbent 
operated a clock-face timetable (from Table 3, 96 trains an hour) entry could be physically 
accommodated.  There is a likelihood that open access will put pressure on clock face 
timetables even though these are valued by passengers (see, for example, Ford and 
Haydock, 1991). 
 
(ii)Auctioning.  For our simple branch line service this would be relatively straightforward as the 
good being auctioned, the train path, is clearly defined.  Operators would bid up to the price 
implied by the demand curve D0 minus AVC associated with operations (as in Figure Four) 
allowing near perfect price discrimination.  In the long run the super normal profits earned 
by Railtrack would be used to invest in new infrastructure.  The main problem here is that 
our simple example is not realistic.  In reality, rail services are a complicated mixture of 
interconnected train paths and platform allocations at stations.  A further complication is 
how such an auctioning process would work with franchising.  Two bodies, Railtrack and 
the Franchising Authority would be competing for income from rail operators.  There is a 
danger of rent appropriation by the Railtrack authority, whilst it is not clear whether the 
Franchising Authority's decisions will take into account payments made to Railtrack. 
 
(iii)Slot trading.  In this scenarios, the incumbent would assess its 120 train runs and determine 
those 32 that it values least or the entrant values most (note this would not produce a half-
hourly service, but could be a close approximation).  The entrant would then be entitled to 
bid for these 32 paths.  In effect, an auction takes place for slots 89 to 120 but in this case 
the rents are likely to be appropriated by the incumbent operator (the Rail Regulator 
permitting). 
 
(iv)None of the above measures appears satisfactory.  A particular problem is that they fail to 
specifically relate prices to costs.  A suggested alternative is administrative procedures 
based around a published tariff.  This will be examined further in the next section. 
 
5.2PRICING POLICY 
 
We maintain our assumption that capacity is fixed at double track and the incumbent operates 120 
trains per day.  An ATC pricing approach would suggest that an entry fee of £23,333 per train run 
should be charged, plus a charge per km based on the proportion of AVC related to variable cost of 
infrastructure.  This assumes that the incumbent is producing at the output level where the demand 
curve intersects the ATC curve.  The proposed entry gives a signal that this is not the case and that 
the demand curve D0 is above the incumbent's estimate of it.  In this case, it is up to the Railtrack to 
estimate where D0 really is and price at SRMC.  From Figure One this would suggest an entry fee of 
around £35,000 per train run.  Administrative procedures, possibly based on franchising, would be 
used to allocate train runs to those operators prepared to pay the entry fee.  In the long run, the 
supernormal profits would be used to expand capacity. 
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So far, we have assumed uniform demand throughout the day.  This is relaxed in Table Five.  We 
assume that existing capacity is provided by double track.  This track is operated at capacity during 
the peak four hours (30 train runs in total).  In this case, the MC of providing additional off-peak 
train runs is merely AVC.  The entry fee should be zero.  By contrast, the marginal cost of providing 
extra capacity in the peak is substantial.  For cost-recovery, an entry fee of at least £93.33 per peak 
train run should be charged.  In other words, the entry fee for a two-part infrastructure tariff should 
be based on peak train runs as they determine capacity requirements.  A problem here is that of the 
shifting peak.  Operators are likely to move services just outside of the peak periods in order to 
avoid the peak entry fees.  An alternative might be to base the entry fee on fleet size (and 
composition) as this is likely to be closely correlated with peak requirements and will also take into 
account the fact that the nature of the service operated will effect infrastructure requirements eg 
gross train weight, train speed etc. 
 
Lastly, we consider the effect of train speeds.  Again our starting points is double track provision 
and the incumbent providing 120 train runs per day.  Suppose, as a result of privatisation, the 
incumbent is split into two.  One of the two operators decides to introduce a service at twice the 
existing speed.  Table Four indicates that this will reduce capacity to 98 trains per day, if a 
timetabling policy of alternative fast and slow trains is implemented.  How should infrastructure be 
allocated and priced in this situation?  Firstly, an administrative decision needs to be made whether 
the decrease in train frequency is worth the increase in speed.  Suppose the answer is yes.  Secondly, 
the entry fee needs to be determined.  Based on ATC, this should be at least £31,429 per train run.  
However, the reduced capacity is not the result of the slow train operator's actions.  In this case, the 
slow train operator might still be charged an entry fee of at least £23,333 per annum per train run 
and the fast train operator a fee of at least £35,000 per annum per train run. 
 
 
6.CONCLUSIONS 
 
Despite a number of simplifying assumptions, our models' illustrate the complexities of determining 
access and pricing regimes for rail infrastructure.  These problems stem from rail infrastructure's 
cost characteristics, its declining costs over a broad output range, its indivisibility and the high 
proportion of joint and common costs.  This leads to expectations of economies of scale, density and 
scope. 
 
Given Railtrack should not receive subsidy and should not discriminate unfairly between users it 
seems that some form of ATC pricing is likely.  This might be based on a two-part tariff, with an 
entry fee per peak vehicle and a variable charge per vehicle km.  This charges will need to be 
differentiated to take into account the effect of train speed and gross weight, in particular, on 
capacity requirements.  Departures from ATC pricing might be expected in situations where 
infrastructure is congested.  In such cases, the entry fee would be increased to reflect SRMC.  The 
resultant profits could be re-invested in capacity expansion.  A pricing regime of this form would 
appear to satisfy the Government's requirements for an access and charging regime provided a 
narrow definition of efficient operation is made.  Theory tells us that pricing at ATC rather than 
LRMC is welfare sub-optimal.  Simulation work is required to assess the extent of this welfare loss 
and the economic costs of a regulation regime that allows pricing at LRMC. 
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One issue we have not addressed is the operational impacts of congestion.  Our capacity 
calculations have not included margins for late running or for track maintenance.  As output reaches 
our `theoretical' capacity limit, reliability problems are likely to increase and this congestion effect 
needs to be considered.  We have assumed that external costs are zero, in practice they are likely to 
be substantial.  Analysis therefore needs to be extended from private to social costs.  However, this 
would then lead to second best issues arising from a pricing regime that reflects social costs of rail 
infrastructure provision and use but does not reflect the social costs of road infrastructure provision 
and use. 
 
A further problem relates to our implicit assumptions of perfect knowledge.  It assumes that 
Railtrack has perfect knowledge of the demand for rail travel and, hence, infrastructure.  In practice, 
there are likely to be symmetries in that this information will mainly be possessed by the rail 
operators.  This problem is confounded by the fact that the level of infrastructure provision and, 
therefore, service quality, effects demand.  A particular problem we have highlighted is the pressure 
that open access is likely to place on clock face timetables. 
 
The last problem we would highlight is that of transaction costs.  Suppose a route is franchised and 
the winning operator proposes to supply a service of 120 trains per day at regular 8 minute intervals. 
 We have previously suggested that an entry fee of £23,333 per train per annum should be set.  
Alternatively, assuming the service could be provided by 8 train sets, a fee of £350,000 per train set 
per annum might be charged.  However, suppose that one quarter of fixed infrastructure costs are 
related to terminals and that terminals A and B are owned by separate property development 
companies.  Assume further that variable costs are £10 per km, of which 10% are variable 
infrastructure costs.  In this case operator Z makes the following cost and revenue estimates (£k per 
annum). 
 
Payment to Railtrack:    4200 
Payment to A:    350 
Payment to B:     350 
Operating Costs:    18900 
Operating Revenue:    21000 
Subsidy from Franchising Authority:  2800 
 
In this situation Z is covering variable costs, but requires a subsidy to cover fixed, infrastructure 
costs.  This could be dealt with by one transaction but, in this case, involves four transactions, each 
of which needs to be overseen by the Rail Regulator.  Extended over the entire network the increase 
in transaction costs is likely to be very substantial. 
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Table One: Assumed Service Capacity with Different Infrastructure Provision -Peak Hour 
 
Infrastructure provision: Single Track One Loop Three Loops Double Track Quadruple 
Track 
Train runs 
Service interval (mins) 
Revised trains runs 
Revised service intervals 
Clockface train runs 
Clockface service interval 
 1 
 60 
 1 
 60 
 1 
 60 
 1.5 
 40.0 
 1.5 
 40.0 
 1.0 
 60.0 
 2.5 
 24.0 
 2.5 
 24.0 
 2.0 
 30.0 
 8.50 
 7.06 
 7.50 
 8.00 
 6.00 
 10.00 
 17.00 
 3.53 
 14.00 
 4.00 
 12.00 
 5.00 
 
 
Table Two: Cost of Infrastructure and Service Operation - Sixteen Hour Day,  
350 Day Year Non Clock Face Headway. 
 
 Single Track One Loop Three 
Loops 
Double 
Track 
Quadruple 
Track 
Train runs 
Train kms pd 
Variable Cost pa (£k) 
Fixed Cost pa (£k) 
Total Cost pa (£k) 
Av. Cost per Train (£k pa) 
Av. Cost per km (£) 
 16.00 
 800.00 
 2800.00 
 1400.00 
 4200.00 
 262.50 
 15.00 
 24.00 
 1200.00 
 4200.00 
 1480.00 
 5680.00 
 236.67 
 13.52 
 40.00 
 2000.00 
 7000.00 
 1640.00 
 8640.00 
 216.00 
 12.34 
 120.00 
 6000.00 
 21000.00 
 2800.00 
 23800.00 
 198.33 
 11.33 
 240.00 
 12000.00 
 42000.00 
 5600.00 
 47600.00 
 198.33 
 11.33 
 
 
Table Three: Costs of Infrastructure and Service Operation - Clock Face Headway 
 
 Single Track Two Loops Five Loops Double Track Quadruple 
Track 
Train Runs 
Train kms pd 
Variable Cost pa (£k) 
Fixed Cost pa (£k) 
Total Cost pa (£) 
Av. Cost per Train (£) 
Av. Cost per km (£) 
 16.00 
 800.00 
 2800.00 
 1400.00 
 4200.00 
 262.50 
 15.00 
 32.00 
 1600.00 
 5600.00 
 1560.00 
 7160.00 
 223.75 
 12.79 
 48.00 
 2400.00 
 8400.00 
 1800.00 
 10200.00 
 212.50 
 12.14 
 96.00 
 4800.00 
 16800.00 
 2800.00 
 19600.00 
 204.17 
 11.67 
 192.00 
 9600.00 
 33600.00 
 5600.00 
 39200.00 
 204.17 
 11.67 
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Table Four: Costs of Infrastructure and Service Operation - Sixteen Hour Day,  
350 Day Year.  Services Different Speed Non Clock Headway. 
 
 Single 
Track 
One Loop Three 
Loops 
Double 
Track 
One Loop Three 
Loops 
Quadruple 
Track 
Train Runs 
Variable Costs 
Fixed Costs 
Total Costs 
Average Costs per 
Train 
Average Cost per 
km 
 20.00 
 3850.00 
   1540.00 
 5390.00 
 269.50 
 
 15.40 
 32.00 
 6160.00 
 1640.00 
 7800.00 
 243.75 
 
 13.93 
 50.00 
 9625.00 
 1840.00 
 11465.00 
 229.30 
 
 13.10 
 98.00 
 18865.00 
 3080.00 
 21945.00 
 223.93 
 
 12.80 
 140.00 
 26950.00 
 3180.00 
 30130.00 
 215.21 
 
 12.30 
 190.00 
 36575.00 
 3380.00 
 39955.00 
 210.29 
 
 12.02 
 196 
 37730 
 6160 
 43890 
 223.93 
 
 12.80 
 
 
Table Five: Peak - Off Peak Charges 
 
 Total Peak Off-Peak 
No of train runs 
Variable Cost 
Fixed Cost 
Total Cost 
Average Cost per train run (k) 
Average Cost per train km 
 42.00 
 7350.00 
 2800.00 
 10150.00 
 241.66 
 13.81 
 30.00 
 5250.00 
 2800.00 
 8050.00 
 268.33 
 15.33 
 12.00 
 2100.00 
 1400.00 
 3500.00 
 291.66 
 16.66 
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